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Mr. Goldstein argues that cooperative development would at least be as
beneficial to the geothermal industry as it is to the petroleum industry. But,
he suggests that attempts by the geothermal industry to voluntarily unitize its
operations will be subject to the unavoidable obstacles and delays that have
reduced the effectiveness of, and sometimes thwarted, voluntary attempts to
unitize hydrocarbon extraction operations. Thus, Mr. Goldstein concludes
by calling for the timely enactment of compulsory unitization schemes.

UNITIZATION FOR GEOTHERMAL
RESOURCES: UNITED WE SAVEt
Dennis B. Goldstein*
I. INTRODUCTION

Approximately seventeen years have passed since commercial production of electricity began at The Geysers, the
only producing geothermal field in the United States. Despite
these seventeen years of production, preceded by several years
of initial field development, no pooling or unitization has yet
taken place there.' Indeed, it is only in recent years that references to unitization of geothermal resources2 appear in the
small but expanding literature concerning the law applicable
CopyrightO 1977 by the University of Wyoming
tThis article was originally published in the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation's Geothermal Resources Development Institute. Reprinted with permission.
*Assistant Counsel, Homestake Mining Company, San Francisco, California; A.B.,
1967, Brown University; J.D., 1971, Stanford University; Graduate Fellow in Comparative Law. 1972. University of Florence, Florence, Italy. Member of the California Bar. Mr. Goldstein is Vice-Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Geothermal Energy.
1. It has also been reported by the office of the Area Geothermal Supervisor, Western
Area, United States Geological Survey, that exploratory unit agreements have
been approved by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 271.8
(1976) in the Roosevelt-Hot Springs and Cove Fort-Sulfurdale as known Geothermal Resources Areas in Utah.
2. Eg., Root, Contents of a Geothermal Lease: Some Suggestions. 8 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 659, 667 (1976); Allen, Legal and Policy Aspects of Geothermal Resource
Development, 8 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 250,255 (1972). An economic analysis of potential problems arising from the production of geothermal resources in
common pools is contained in Franzen, Property Systems in GeothermalResources:
A Critique and Recommendations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND UNITED
NATIONS SYMPOSIUM ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES 2373 (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 1976) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
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to geothermal resources.' The absence of a geothermal unit
or pool at The Geysers might be taken as an indication that
such cooperative development is neither necessary nor useful.
Nevertheless, it is submitted here that the present lack of
unitization or pooling at The Geysers should not be construed
as an indication that such cooperative development is unnecessary or lacks utility. 4 On the contrary, an analysis of pooling and unitization in the geothermal context reveals that cooperative field development would be at least as beneficial to
the geothermal industry as it is to the petroleum industry.

At the outset, it should be noted that although the terms
"pooling" and "unitization" are often used interchangeably,
they do have different meanings as oil and gas terms of art.
"Pooling" refers to the aggregation of tracts of land for the
purpose of creating a single drilling unit, sometimes in connection with a program or requirement of uniform or minimum spacing and its implementation does not necessarily
eliminate competition within a single pool or field.6 "Unitization", on the other hand, refers to an attempt to group all
or most of the interests in a producing reservoir so as to enable joint, rather than competitive, operations in all or some
part of the reservoir as if it were under common ownership.6
3. Recent articles concerning geotherml resources include not only those cited in
note 2, supra, but also the following: Aidlin, Representing the Geothermal Resources Client, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 27 (1974); Bjorge, The Development
of Geothermal Resources and the 1970 Geothermal Steam Act-Law in Search of
Definition, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1974); Schlauch & Worcester, Geothermal Resources: a Primer for the Practitioner, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 327 (1974);
Bible, The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 86 (1971); Olpin,
The Law of Geothermal Resources, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 123 (1968);
Brooks, Legal Problems of the Geothermal Industry, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 511
(1966); Randall, Acquisition of Geothermal Rights, 1 IDAHO L. REV. 49 (1964).
A number of additional articles appear in the Legal and Institutional Aspects section of the PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2 at 2353-2457.
4. The lack of pooling or unitization at The Geysers probably results from the fact
that substantial development there has taken place in areas where ownership is relatively unfragmented; for example, considerable development has taken place in
The Geysers area on the 3,988.3 acres of land claimed by the State of California
through mineral reservations and by private parties through surface ownership and
leased to the same operator by all claimants. If the State's mineral claim to the resources is upheld, development of the entire 3,988.3 acres will be controlled by only
two leases; while, if the private parties' claim prevails, only five leases will control
the same acreage. See note 55, infra. The operator has no adjacent competitors in
production.
5. See SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW 150 (1955); 5 SUMMERS, OIL
AND GAS § 950 at 55 (1966) and 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §
901 at 2-3.
6. See King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Leases, 46 MICH. L. REV. 311,
312-314 (1948) and Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J.
1207, 1208-1211 (1948).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/8

2

Goldstein: Unitization for Geothermal Resources: United We Save

1977

UNITIZATION FOR GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES

161

These definitions indicate that the purpose of unitization,
in the oil and gas context, is to permit operations as if the
field or reservoir has no internal boundary lines. Unitized operations are said to permit maximum use of reservoir energy
and increase ultimate recovery and profit in a number of
ways.7 Most importantly, unit operations allow a centralized
reservoir manager to set the locations and rates of production
without regard to competing property interests. This eliminates the need for offset or unnecessary wells,8 permits scientific well-spacing and placement, allows reservoir-wide determnation of maximum efficient rates of production, and, in
some cases, facilitates various oilfield operations which could
be carried out with difficulty, if at all, by individual overlying
operators. These operations include waterflooding, 9 pressure
maintenance, 0 gas cycling" and gas storage. Still another
benefit of unitization is the protection afforded to the correlative rights of the participating parties.12
The purpose of pooling in the context of oil and gas is to
provide for common drill sites; this results in minimizing capital expenditures by preventing the drilling of unnecessary
wells, protects the correlative rights of the participants, and,
in some cases allows drilling where none of the participating
tracts is large enough to qualify for a well permit. 3
Because the purposes of "pooling" and "unitization"
have much in common, current usage tends to ignore their
technical differences. Since this paper is concerned with cooperative development rather than technical differences between pooling and unitization, it will follow the current practice.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

It has been said that oil unitization results in less capital investment, lower development and operating costs, greater per acre oil yield, stabilized business, more control over business, and a savings on plant capacity, pipeline and storage tanks.
Myers, Spacing, Poolingand Field-Wide Unitization, 18 MISS. L.J. 267, 273 (1947).
Jacobs, supra note 6, at 1210.
Myers, The Necessity of Unitization, 33 MISS. L.J. 1, 7 (1961).
Myers, supra note 9, at 4-7; King, supra note 6, at 312-314.
Myers, supra note 9, at 4-7;6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 901 at 3-4.
See Kaveler, The Engineering Basis for and the Results from the Unit Operation of
Oil Pools, 23 TUL. L. REV. 331, 334 (1949). For a discussion of unitization see
SULLIVAN, supra note 5 at 356 et seq.
For a discussion of pooling see HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION 87 (1965) and 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, §§ 901-907 at 3-84
and materials cited therein.
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II. A RESERVOIR MODEL
To evaluate the utility of unitization in the geothermal
context, it is necessary to have a reservoir model as a reference. The Geysers geothermal field in Sonoma and Lake
Counties, California is suitable for this purpose.
A recent and readily available geological, geophysical and
engineering analysis of The Geysers geothermal field may be
found in the testimony of the expert witnesses in the recent
trial in Pariani v. State of California." The issue in that case,
tried to the court in July of 1976, was whether the State of
California reserved the right to extract and exploit the geothermal resources underlying lands which the State had patented to private parties subject to a lengthy reservation of
minerals.' 5 The court heard expert testimony from several
witnesses, including two geophysicists, a geologist, and a reservoir engineer who had reviewed considerable data from wells
in The Geysers field. The experts did not agree on all matters,
but there was substantial agreement that The Geysers is a socalled "dry steam" field in which all successful drilling has
encountered geothermal resources in the steam phase rather
than the liquid phase.'6 Despite this "dry steam" nomenclature, the experts also concluded that the ultimate source of
the steam produced at The Geysers consists of one or more
reservoirs of boiling liquid." The experts reached this conclusion because the volume of steam produced at The Geysers
has already exceeded the maximum volume of fluid that can
be stored as steam in an area the size of The Geysers 18 even
assuming generous field dimensions and high porosity. Since
The Geysers nevertheless continues to produce steam, the experts believe that steam is continually fed into the producing
intervals of wells after boiling off one or more deep liquid
reservoirs.
The producing intervals of successful wells seem to be located at the intersections of the well bores and one or more
14. Trial Transcript, Pariani v. State of California, Superior Court for the City and
County of San Francisco No. 657-291 [hereinafter cited as Pariani Transcript].
Certain portions of the ParianiTranscriptwere sealed by order of the Court to protect the confidentiality of data; none of the material relied upon herein is drawn
from the sealed portions of the transcript.
15. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6401 and 6407 (West 1977).
16. Pariani Transcript,supra note 14, at 689-691.
17. Id. at 225-226, 651.
18. Id. at 225-226, 651, 714, 726, 764-765.
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fractures which communicate ultimately with the boiling
liquids. 19 Such communicating fractures are then the highways of the geothermal system at The Geysers.
The Geysers field, at least to the depths to which it has
been drilled, has a fairly uniform initial pressure which has
shown some decline over the years as a function of production.20 This uniform pressure is less than hydrostatic, but
considerably greater than atmospheric, and geothermal fluid
is forced up the well bore to the area of lower pressure when
it intersects a communicating fracture. The pressure differential is great enough that the geothermal fluids expelled through
the well bore carry with them energy capable of driving turbines to produce electricity. The underpressured condition of
the reservoir is maintained, at least in part, by a nearly impermeable seal of hydrothermal mineral deposits which acts
as a barrier between the underpressured fluids within and the
2
normal hydrostatic conditions without the reservoir. '
Although present operations extract heated fluid, the vast
majority of reservoir heat is contained in reservoir rocks rather
than in the fluids.22

III. UNITIZATION APPLIED TO THE GEOTHERMAL MODEL
A. Increasing Ultimate Recovery and Maximizing Use
of Geothermal Energy
Maximizing the use of reservoir energy and increasing ultimate recovery are among the most frequently cited reasons
for oil unitization. Long experience reveals that production
of hydrocarbon wells at rates greater than the maximum efficient rate of production2 can reduce ultimate recovery by
permanently damaging reservoirs. This is especially clear in
gas-drive oil reservoirs where poor or decentralized field con19
20.
21.
22.
23.

d. at 649-650.
Id. at 123-125,296,774.
Id. at 141-142, 291-293,650-652.
Id. at 763-764.
"Maximum efficient rate" of production is defined as the upper limit of production beyond which any increase will mean a decrease in the amount of oil ultimately recoverable. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 315. See Smith, The Kansas Unitization
Statutes: Part I, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 567, 573-580 (1967).
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trol, or even simple greed, has resulted in overly rapid depletion of the reservoir's gas causing a loss of the reservoir's nat24
ural production force.
Although experience with geothermal reservoirs is far
more limited, geothermal reservoir engineering theory nevertheless indicates that the concept of reservoir energy is equally important in the geothermal context. 5 In fact, research
already suggests that production rates in geothermal reservoirs
affect total geothermal reservoir energy in several ways.
1. Maximizing Total Energy Recovery
Through Unitized Operations
If a single geothermal reservoir is exploited to achieve
maximum short-term production of fluids, and therefore
electricity, the fluids which convey reservoir energy to the
surface could be depleted so rapidly as to sharply reduce reservoir pressure and impair a reservoir's ability to carry energy
to the surface. If fluid depletion were to occur before a reservoir's total recoverable heat were extracted, the result
would be loss of energy. Since the recovery of energy from a
geothermal reservoir is dependent upon the reservoir's supply
of both heat and fluid, and since geothermal reservoirs are often fluid-deficient relative to heat, maximum fluid production rates over the short-term may result in less than total recovery of extractable energy. Thus, it is pertinent to ask
whether limiting the rate of production below the maximum
possible will, as it sometimes does in the oil context, result in
the extraction of energy not recoverable at higher production
rates. If the answer to this question is affirmative, there should
exist for each reservoir, a rate of production that will maximize energy extraction.
Although there is now clear evidence from several of the
world's commercially exploited geothermal reservoirs that
reservoir pressures drop as a function of production over
time, 26 the question just posed has not been conclusively re24. See SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 335-336 and WILLIAMS, MAXWELL & MEYERS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 9 (3d ed. 1974).

25. The author is indebted to Professor Paul Witherspoon, Director of the Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory's Geothermal Project, and one of the experts who testified in
the Parianicase, for his advice relative to the technical discussions herein.
26. See note 20, supra; Budd, Steam Production at The Geysers Geothermal Field, in
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solved; it has, however, recently generated considerable interest and at least two geothermal researchers who have experimented with this problem have cautiously concluded that for
geothermal reservoirs with a finite water volume or geothermal reservoirs with limited water influx:
[A] n optimum fluid production rate exists which will
result in the greatest amount of heat production.
Rates above this optimum will both shorten the life
of the well and decrease the amount of heat produced
while rates below the optimum will result in less heat
production and longer well life. In both extremes the
economics of the project will be adversely affected."
These same researchers have concluded that extremely high
production rates may be desirable in reservoirs with high water influx. 3
If total geothermal energy recovery is a function of the
rate of production, oil unitization experiences provide a model
which demonstrates that unitization in the geothermal context will facilitate increased energy extraction by eliminating
intra-reservoir competition and permitting application of
maximum economic production rates on a field-wide basis.
In addition, even if varying the rate of production will
not permit increased energy recovery, geothermal operators
may increase ultimate recovery through other means which
will be facilitated by unitization. Since the vast majority of
geothermal reservoir heat is contained in reservoir rocks rather
than reservoir fluids, it is not likely to be extracted before
geothermal fluids in place are depleted. 3 Under such circumstances maximum extraction of geothermal reservoir energy
will be realized by injecting, or reinjecting, cooler fluids into
geothermal reservoirs. The theory is that such fluids will be
GEOTHERMAL ENERGY: RESOURCES, PRODUCTION, STIMULATION 129 (Kruger

and Otte eds. 1973); Celati, Squarci, and Taffi, Analysis of Water Levels and Reservoir Pressure Measurement, in Geothermal Wells, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2,
at 1583 (Lardarello, Italy); and Stilwell, Hall and Tawhai, Ground Movement in
New Zealand Geothermal Fields, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 1427, 1429
(figure 3).
27. Robinson and Morse, A Study of the Effects of Various Reservoir Parameters on
the Performance of Geothermal Reservoirs, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at
1772. See also, Chasteen, Geothermal Steam Condensate Reinjection, in PROCEEDINGS at 1325.
28. Robinson and Morse, supra note 27.
29. See Chasteen, supra note 27.
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heated and, when produced, bring out heat not recoverable
through extraction of reservoir fluids in place.0 A technical
study has described this theory as follows:
A reinjection process may be considered as a way
of increasing the amount of heat recovered from a
geothermal reservoir which does not have a natural
water drive ....
if a reservoir did not contain enough water to
remove all of the available heat from the rock, it
might be desirable to add more water by injection.
This situation could occur in a reservoir with low porosity.31
Another study has concluded that "reinjection of water
would ... mak[e] it possible to extract more heat out of
the hot reservoir rock, and thus to increase the total energy
82
production over the.life of the field."
...

This theory has already been put into limited practice at,
3 where, in fact, all extractamong other places, The Geysers8
ed geothermal fluid not lost to evaporation in the cooling
process (approximately twenty-five per cent of the fluid produced) is reinjected.' Reinjection began as a technique to
dispose of produced fluids that could not be safely or legally
discharged to the environment; however, the re-introduction
of such fluids beneath the surface has not only disposed of
them, but also allowed them to enter the reservoir and become heated, thereby prolonging the reservoir's commercial
lifetime.3u
Injection to increase recoverable energy is likely to become standard practice in the geothermal industry. 6 The operator's goal under such circumstances will be to efficiently
30. This is well illustrated by the socalled "hot dry rock" theory which suggests fracturing "dry" rock and then introducing fluids for the purpose of extracting the
same fluids after they have become heated. See, eg., Smith, Aamodt, Potter and
Brown,Man-Made Geothermal Reservoirs, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 1781.
31. Robinson and Morse, supra note 27,at 1777.
32. Einarsson, Vides and Cuellar, Disposal of Geothermal Waste Water by Reinjection,
in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 1349 1360-61.
33. Pariani Transcript, supra note 14, at 344.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id. at 40-41,117.
36. One of the technical papers quoted in the text went on to conclude that "The advantages ... [of] reinjection into the geothermal reservoir are considered to be of
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coordinate the rates of production and injection over appropriate time periods so as to extract the maximum economic
quantity of energy. This coordination bears some resemblance
to the determination of the maximum efficient rate of production in secondary waterflooding oil practices; there, too,
the engineer must find and juggle optimum rates of production and injection in order to maximize economic resource
extraction.
Many advantageous economic and conservation consequences would flow from the establishment and use of optimum production rates, whether or not brought about in conjunction with injection. The most obvious and perhaps most
valuable one is the ability to recover more energy from a reservoir.37 To accomplish this, however, each reservoir which in
fact behaves as a single physical unit must be developed and
operated as a unit; planning, data and coordination on a fieldwide rather than local basis will be prerequisite.
such significance that it should be adopted as part of the management of waterdominated steam fields irrespective of whether there exists a disposal problem or
not." Einarsson, Vides and Cuellar, supra note 32, at 1361. Reinjection has already
been utilized in the United States, El Salvador (id.), France (Gringarten and Sauty,
The Effect of Reinjection on the Temperature of a Geothermal Reservoir Used for
Urban Heating, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 1370) and Japan (Kubota and
Aosaki, Reinjection of Geothermal Hot Water at the Otake Geothermal Field, in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 1379).
In the Kubota and Aosaki paper it was reported that a geothermal power
plant with an initial output of 11 Megawatts saw its output decrease to 8.7 Megawatts. When reinjection was commenced, the output of the power station recovered to a level of 10 Megawatts without the drilling of supplemental production
wells, Id. at 1382.
37. Still other advantages of reinjection suggested in the literature already referred to
in notes 27 through 32, supra, include pressure maintenance, prevention of subsidence and utilization of heat remaining in geothermal fluids after production of
electricity. The suggestion relating to pressure maintenance may prove to be important.

At least in some geothermal reservoirs, water encroachment seems to begin
or increase as reservoir pressure declines. See Celati, Noto, Panichi, Squarci, and
Taffi, Interactions Between the Steam Reservoir and Surrounding Aquifers in the
Lardarello Geothermal Field, 2 GEOTHERMICS 174, 182 (Nos. 3-4, 1973). Theoretically, this is explained as follows: Until a geothermal reservoir is disturbed by
drilling, the relatively cooler water of surrounding adjacent formations is impeded
from rapidly invading the reservoir and lowering its temperature by a number of
factors which may include pressure differentials. Sufficient production, and subsequent declines in reservoir pressure, however, could modify any existing equilibrium between fluids in and out of the reservoir; since such reservoir pressure declines are tantamount to relative increases in extra-reservoir pressure, water may
then migrate into certain types of geothermal reservoirs. The effect of such encroachment is uncertain, but it could range, depending on rate and quantity, from
beneficial recharge of fluids produced to a cooling of the reservoir sufficient to
impair its commercial usefulness.
Because the unpredictable effect of such encroachment could be harmful, it
may be desirable to eliminate it and instead rely on injection to obtain any benefit
that might result from recharge. Encroachment which is caused by increasing pressure differentials should be prevented if pressure is maintained by replacing extracted fluids. So long as the temperature of the rocks is adequate to heat injected
fluids as they enter the reservoir, pressure maintenance should be feasible.
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The established mechanism to accomplish such coordination, by developing reservoirs as if under single ownership, is
unitized operation. 38 Unitization would provide, as it does in
the oil context, the opportunity for centralized reservoir
management decisions unhampered by considerations of intrareservoir competition. The reservoir operator would be in a
position to make all decisions that bear upon maximum recovery by reviewing reservoir-wide data concerning the rate
of production, production well location and spacing, 39 rate of
40
injection and injection well location.
2. Maximizing the Economic Use of
Recovered Geothermal Energy
Apart from increasing total energy recovery, the ability
to control reservoir-wide rates of production and injection
also will be important in achieving maximum economic use
of recovered geothermal energy.
Geothermal energy, unlike oil or gas, cannot economically be transported long distances or stored for long periods of
time without significant loss of energy. 41 Thus, unlike the oil
producer who may not be concerned with the identity of the
consumer, the producer of geothermal resources must be prepared to deal personally with the consumer. He must, if he is
to sell his product, convince a consumer to make a capital investment near the reservoir he is exploiting.
Ideally, an energy consumer's decision to make a capital
investment at the site of a geothermal reservoir should be
based on factors which include the total amount of recoverable energy available to him, the size and cost of a proposed
38.

This is not to imply that other tools might not be capable of accomplishing a similar result, as for example, the imposition of field rules or a plan of operation "to
" See 30
ensure . . . maximum ultimate recovery . . . with minimum waste ....
C.F.R. § 270.11, 270.15, 270.30, 270.34 (1976). Moreover, it has been suggested
that production quotas and use taxes might be possible approaches. Franzen, supra

note 2, at 2378.
Well-spacing appears to be as important for geothermal resources as for oil and gas,
with reduced outputs resulting from wells located too close to one another. See
James, Optimum Well Spacing for Geothermal Power, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note
2, at 1681. It follows, therefore, that centralized control of the surface overlying a
reservoir would permit optimum well-spacing. Although this is a rather obvious
benefit to be derived from unitization, it is nonetheless an important one.
40. See INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N, A STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL
AND GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (1964). Injection wells should not be located too close to production wells since localized production may otherwise be impaired through cooling. Einarsson, Vides and Cuellar, supra note 32, at 1351, 1360.
41. ParianiTranscript,supra note 14, at 726-727,821-823.
39.
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facility or facilities and the return he can expect from such
facilities over their useful economic life. With adequate data,
such a consumer could calculate the size and economic lifetime of an optimal facility, i.e., a facility which would not
only permit recoupment of capital investment, but also provide a return sufficient to replace the facility and the energy
source at the end of their useful lifetimes.
The larger the energy consumption of the consumer's facility the higher will be the rate of production necessary to
sustain it. If the consumer chooses to construct a facility that
requires a rate of production high enough to deplete the reservoir before the end of the facility's useful economic lifetime, the relative cost of the facility per unit of consumption
capacity will be wastefully increased, and profits per unit of
resource will fall accordingly. 2 Thus, it is no surprise to learn
that Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the sole consumer at
The Geysers, sought expert assurance that the steam supply
at The Geysers is adequate to sustain that Company's local
generating facilities over a thirty-year useful lifetime, given
the production rates required by the design of those facili43
ties.
While the consumer is primarily concerned with the cost
and useful lifetime of his facility, the producer deals with different economics. For exampe, the producer will be interested in maximizing the return on his opportunity costs over the
shortest possible time period; if profit would not be maximized by postponing current production, this could involve
producing wells at relatively high rates of production. While
the producing lifetime of the field is a function of its reserves
and the selected rates of production, the useful lifetime of
the consuming facility is determined by additional factors including its profitability and physical life. Under these circumstances it would be mere chance if the producer's optimum
production rate and field lifetime were to coincide with the
required production rate and economic lifetime of the consumer's facility.
42. For an economic discussion of the optimal lifetime of a resource see Peterson,
Economic Factors in Resource Exploration and Exploitation, in PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 2, at 2233.
43. See ParianiTranscript,supra note 14, at 726-727,821-823.
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A producer of geothermal resources, therefore, is not likely to be free to determine rates of production solely with reference to engineering data and his own opportunity costs.44 In
order to create a market for his product, he may have to supply energy at a rate of production determined as much by the
needs of his consumer as by his own needs. At the very least,
he will be called upon by potential consumers to set forth the
reservoir's production capability in terms of rates of production and the time periods over which the reservoir can sustain
such rates.
In order to deliver energy to a consumer at a specified
production rate over a sufficiently long time period, the producer will find it necessary to obtain and exercise complete
physical control over the reservoir. A utility or other consumer is unlikely to make a significant capital investment which
is the captive of a specific geothermal energy source unless it
is convinced that the reservoir's reserves are adequate to supply its requirements over a time period sufficient to justify its
investment. Nor is such a consumer likely to be attracted by
a producer's offer to sell resources from a reservoir unless all
of that reservoir's reserves are under the same producer's
complete control.
The degree of physical reservoir control necessary to insure economic reservoir control can be achieved by unitizing
to eliminate intra-reservoir competition. With unitized operations both producer and consumer can be secure in the knowledge that operating decisions significantly affecting the eco45
nomics of their operations will be under their control.
B. Prevention of the Drillingof Unnecessary Wells
An often repeated reason for unitization in the oil context is that it can obviate the need to drill unnecessary wells. 46
44. See generally Dan, Hersam, Kho and Krumland,Development of a Typical Generating Unit at The Geysers, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 1949, 1951. This source
provides details concerning the Pacific, Gas and Electric Company's decisions to
invest in power plants at The Geysers.
45. Thus, it has been concluded that the success of Pacific Gas and Electric Company's
venture at The Geysers is, in part, "due primarily to the availability of a unique and
valuable resource, the long-range planning and close coordination between PG&E
and its geothermal steam suppliers, and the mutually favorable economic performance of this project." Id. at 1857 (emphasis added).
46. An unnecessary well is one that fails to increase the ultimate recovery from a field
by an amount sufficient to return the investment in it plus its cost of operation.
See King, supra note 6, at 312.
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Given The Geysers model of a geothermal reservoir, under
what circumstances, if any, would a geothermal operator be
motivated to drill unnecessary wells? Such motivation could
be attributed to an operator who has one or more competitors in a single reservoir; assuming he is permitted to do so,
he will continue to drill additional wells so long as his production increases, even though production from the reservoir
as a whole might be lowered. His competitors, of course,
would have the same motive and right. With numerous competitors in one reservoir, however, none of them is likely to
have access to field-wide data adequate to determine whether
additional wells are in fact unnecessary. And, even assuming
it were obvious that additional wells were unnecessary, such
wells might still be drilled since they could nevertheless provide any individual producer with a competitive advantage.
Moreover, where well-spacing is not regulated, as at The
Geysers, 47 the well-spacing determination is left, of course, to
the operators. From an economic standpoint, the ratio between surface acreage and the number of wells should be
based upon considerations of efficiency. Ideally, an operator
should determine the maximum acreage that one well would
drain efficiently and drill only one well for each multiple of
that acreage overlying the reservoir. In application, such determinations will undoubtedly involve more than simple acreage calculations," but in any event it is clear that such de-

terminations can be best made, if at all, with access to reservoir-wide data.
'The probability of unnecessary wells would ordinarily be
greatest on tracts where overlying land ownership is most
fragmented, because the traditional "offset" well problem
will appear. From The Geysers model, it can be concluded
that a producing interval nestled up to a common boundary
might well drain resources from adjacent properties. If the
"rule of capture" applies to geothermal steam, the operator,
in the absence of unitization, may "only go and do likeThe California Public Resources Code does, however, contain minimum set back requirements for geothermal wells. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 3757 and 3757.1
(West 1977). See 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 1934 (1976).
48. In the oil context, this determination may not always be made on the basis of surface acreage alone. See SULLIVAN, supra note 5, text accompanying n.1 at 297
47.

(1955).
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wise",49 i.e., offset any drainage by drilling a well bottomed
equally close to that common boundary, even though it has
long been recognized that this is a wasteful practice.5 0 Moreover, if the operator is a lessee, he may have a duty as well as
a motive to do so.51
The rule of capture, which still affects petroleum resources
management in the United States, amounts to a license for
the oil producer to reduce to his possession as much oil as he
can, notwithstanding the fact that the oil produced may be
drained from lands subject to exploitation by others.52 Although the effect of this rule has been moderated by compulsory unitization, regulation, production controls, and the
doctrine of correlative rights, it enhances neither central reservoir management nor maximum efficiency. 53 While no case
has yet specifically considered the applicability of this rule to
geothermal resources, it would not be illogical, even if arguably unwise, for a court to extend application of the rule of
capture from oil to other underground fluid sources of energy such as geothermal resources. At least one court has intuitively applied the rule to a salt water recycling operation in
Arkansas where the sole purpose of the operation was to extract bromide and other minerals from the water.5
49. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.. 216 Pa. 362. 65 A. 801.802 (1907).
50. See, eg., Bernstein v.Bush 29 Cal. 2d 773,177 P.2d 913, 195 (1947) and SULLIVAN, supra note 5,.at 46, 20.
51. In the oil context, a lessee has a "rigid" duty, as well as a motive, to drill offset
wells t6 protect against drainage. Renner v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 187 Kan. 158,
354 P.2d 326 (1960); 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 399 at 568 (1959).
52. See Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Company V. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18
A. 724,725 (1889).
53. For a discussion of the rule of capture see Kuntz, Correlative Rights of Parties
Owning Interests in a Common Source of Supply of Oil or Gas, SW. LEGAL
FOUND. SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 217
S1966) and Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, SW. LEGAL FOUND.
IXTH ANNUAL INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 255 (1955).
An interesting California case which describes some of the mischief that can
result from application of the rule of capture in the absence of unitization is
Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d. 299, 206 P.2d. 944
(1949).
In that case the court was unsuccessfully requested to order common or unit
operation of an oil and gas condensate filed for purposes of recycling and pressure
maintenance even though the allegations were that non-unitized operations would
result in a loss of 61,000,000 barrels of oil; arguments presented to the court were
that a cause of action existed to compel such operation in order to prevent waste
under California Public Resources Code Sections 3106 and 3300 and to protect the
correlative rights of overlying landowners. In rejecting the arguments as possible
grounds for legislative but not judicial action, the court noted that the rule of capture is increasingly subject to control and limitation by government regulation. I
206 P.2d. at 949.
54. Budd v. Ethyl Corporation, 474 S.W.2d. 411 (Ark. 1972). This case is very interesting for the differing judicial views expressed with regard to the scope of the rule of
capture and very amusing for the ingenuity involved. The rule of capture was held
applicable to a salt-water recycling operation, the purpose of which was the re-
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The most enlightened approach to this issue would probably be the development of a new set of rules tailored to meet
the unique problems of geothermal resources. In the absence
moval and sale of commercially valuable minerals from the salt-water. Appellees
were producing and reinjecting the salt-water on leases totalling 16,000 acres. Appellant was the owner of a very small interest in a leasehold to extract the saltwater on 40 acres of the 16,000 (no production well was located on the subject 40
acres) and held an undivided interest in the minerals in an adjoining 240 acres. Appellant, who was plaintiff below, asserted drainage for which appellees should account to him for his share of extracted minerals. With regard to the 240-acre
parcel, the court rejected his claim, over a dissent, saying:
That argument is refuted by the law of capture, which we hold
to be applicable in this situation ....

We do not agree with the appellant's insistence that the law of
capture was completely nullified by the statute which permits ...compulsory unitization in oil and gas fields .... Of course the rule of capture does not apply in fact situations where the . . . power to order
unitization has actually been exercised. But there has been no unitization with respect to the 240 acre tract in which appellant owns an
undivided mineral interest; and furthermore, we find no authority .. .
to order the unitization of salt-water operations that have no bearing
upon the extraction or conservation of oil or gas. It follows that the
law of capture prevents the appellant from maintaining his first asserted cause of action. Id. at 412-413.
Surprisingly, the court also rejected the claims with regard to the 40-acre
parcel since the appellant's rights were "inchoate" and apparently since no production from that parcel had been reduced to the possession of appellant's cotenant,
the appellee. The court said:
Thus, there is no trespass upon a vested existing property right, as is
the case when a tenant in common of the mineral ownership drills a
producing oil or gas well without the consent of his cotenant. Id at
413.
On what it thought were substantially identical facts, a federal district court
reached the same result in a diversity action filed by the owners in fee of 180 acres
of land surrounded by the recycling operation. Young v. Ethyl Corporation, 382 F.
Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1974). As had the Arkansas court in Budd, the district court
stressed that appellant had refused a request to share in the risk as well as the potential profits prior to the commencement of the recycling operations.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed in what appears to be a correct result reached by a masterpiece of sophistry designed to circumvent the rule in Erie v. Tompkins. Young v. Ethyl Corporation, 521 F.2d 771
(8th Cir. 1975). Concluding that it was clear under Arkansas law (the Budd case)
that there was no cause of action for mineral loss by drainage, the court nevertheless reversed on grounds that the Supreme Court of Arkansas had not yet considered whether a cause of action would lie for the loss of the "non-fugacious" brine
that would not have migrated away from appellant's property, but for the force
exerted by appellee's injection operation. Id. at 774. The court also distinguished
Young's situation from Budd's on the 40-acre parcel since Young held a fee interest
while Budd had only a leasehold interest. Free to examine whether such a cause of
action was barred by the rule of capture under Arkansas law, the court decided
that the Arkansas Supreme Court would decide, if it had the chance, that it was
not barred. The court said:
First, we do not believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would
extend a rule developed in the field of oil and gas to the forced migration of minerals of different physical properties. The rule 'of capture
has been applied exclusively, as far as we know, to the escape, seepage
or drainage of "fugacious" minerals which occurs as an inevitable result
of the tapping of a common reservoir ....We agree with the defendants

that the Arkansas Supreme Court foreclosed such arguments with respect to the drainage of minerals from adjacent lands. But Young does
Rather,
not claim that he is losing minerals due to seepage or drainage ....
he asserts ...that the brine solution under his land would not migrate to
the defendant's production wells but for the force exerted by the injection wells ....

Second, even accepting the defendant's contention that the brine
• . . must be treated no differently than would oil or gas, the common
law rule of capture is not a license to plunder. Rather, it has an important corollary in the doctrine of "correlative rights" .... The defendants would have us ignore [the doctrine of correlative rights] by urging
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of such legislative or judicial innovation, however, there seems
little likelihood of escaping intuitive judicial application of
the rule of capture at least by some courts. 5
Judicial application of the rule of capture could cause
waste. First, there is no reason to assume that the social costs

55.

that salt water brine is not governed by oil and gas law. They cannot
have their cake and eat it too; if the rule of capture is to be applied to
salt water brine, the doctrine of correlative rights must likewise be applied. Id. at 774-775.
An alternative to the law of capture as a judicial approach to resolution of disputes
concerning competing ownership interests in common geothermal pools could be
drawn from the rules applied to water reservoirs. Since underground water is not
generally managed as an energy -producing resource, however, there is no reason to
suspect that the application o such rules would promote efficient energy management.
For an argument that the application of water law models to geothermal resources would produce a race to appropriate with results similar to the unbridled
application of the oil rule of capture, as well as poor allocation of the resource due
to restrictions on marketability, see Franzen, supra note 2 at 2373. See also STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOciETY, GEOTHERMAL ENERGY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 101-103 (1975).
At least one lower court judge was convinced, without the benefit of a trial
or other evidentiary hearing, that geothermal resources at The Geysers are simply
"superheated water (or steam)" rather than a mineral for purposes of the federal
government's reservation of minerals in patents issued pursuant to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. United States v. Union Oil Company of California, 369 F.
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Since geothermal resources, like coal, oil and gas, are primarily sources of
energy, they should be treated similarly, i.e., as minerals, for purposes of deciding
ownership between the owners of surface and mineral estates. The intent of an individual who reserves, or takes a grant of, a mineral estate seems more likely to
actually have embraced the use of all underground resources which share their primary function with other "minerals" such as coal, oil and gas. Accord, Olpin, supra
note 3, at 137-141. See also Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil & Gas in Wyoming,
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produced by such a rule in the geothermal context would differ from the costs in the oil context where:
[S] ociety incurred the cost not only of a resource
too hastily depleted but also of resources put into unnecessary wells that sometimes lined surface bound'
aries like fenceposts."M
Second, despite the fact that compulsory unitization and other regulatory controls now prevent much oil waste that otherwise would be caused by the rule, these are usually statutory
in origin and presumably would require legislative application
to geothermal resources.
The problems of offset and other unnecessary wells can
be minimized, if not eliminated, by unitized operations which
promote centralized reservoir management and realistically
apportion production regardless of the locus of extraction. If
unitization is unavailable or rejected by the gambler's instinct, 57 the unfortunate American historical experience with
oil and gas offset and other unnecessary wells could repeat itself. From this perspective alone, it appears that the economic
benefit to be derived from unitization justifies its widespread
use where individual geothermal reservoirs would otherwise
be subject to wasteful competitive development.
C. The Need for Drilling Units
Another reason frequently advanced for oil unitization is
the need or desire to create drilling units, sometimes of a prescribed minimum size. That reason applies to geothermal resources as well.
In the first place, where economic benefits are to be derived from uniform or minimum well-spacing patterns, small
tracts cannot participate in such benefits without first combining to form larger units. If minimum spacing is prescribed
by regulatory controls, it may be necessary to pool simply to
reach minimum size to qualify for a permit or other entitlement for use. Moreover, with directional drilling possible in
56.

Devany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21

STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (1969). For an economic analysis of the dislocation
that can be caused by application of a rule of capture, see Franzen, supra note 2.

57.

See Section V, infra.
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some areas, surface acreage used for geothermal development
could be minimized by utilizing centralized drilling locations.
Economic and aesthetic advantages would result; and where
recent statutory law requires the preparation of an environmental impact report (or statement) incorporating possible
measures to mitigate or lessen environmental impacts, 58 centralized drilling sites may play an important role in future
geothermal development. Undoubtedly, there will be substantial environmental pressures, both public and governmental,
to utilize such sites wherever possible.
In the second place, unlike the oil industry where a ready
market exists even for small quantities of the resource, geothermal extraction operations can, with present technology,
pay to produce only when carried out on a scale large enough
to attract either a utility or another in situ consumer. If the
primary market for geothermal resources continues to consist
of utilities or other relatively large consumers of electricity,
tracts with smaller production volumes should unitize in order
to enhance their attractiveness to potential consumers and
compete with larger geothermal tracts. Although numerous
small tracts could each provide a portion of the geothermal
resources for one consuming facility, transaction costs should
always be lower for the consumer dealing with one unit operator.
Finally, since it is not uncommon for geothermal leases
to require the lessee to drill or attempt to drill one or more
wells, numerous leases affecting small tracts overlying a common geothermal reservoir could result in the drilling in aggregate of more wells than would efficiently drain the total acreage under lease. In contrast, a unitization agreement traditionally provides that the drilling requirements of the individual
leases participating in the unit shall be satisfied by virtue of
drilling anywhere in the unit.
D. Protectionof "CorrelativeRights"
If a geothermal reservoir is successfully unitized, the unit
participants can expect the same protection for their rights in
58. See, eg., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq.
(1970) and the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 21000 et seq. See also 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15143(c). Some of the impact
of CEQA upon oil operations may be absorbed from No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66 (1974).
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the geothermal reservoir as is afforded to participants in a
unitized oil operation. Moreover, unit profit, and the participant's share of it, should be maximized by the operator's ability: (1) to increase the recovery of energy, (2) to place both
production and injection wells in the locations most desirable
from an engineering standpoint and (3) to avoid drilling unnecessary wells. Notwithstanding these benefits, however,
problems concerning protection of the so-called "correlative
rights" in the oil context 59 have counterparts in the geothermal context which raise several interesting issues:
1. Allocation of Unit Production
Probably the most difficult problem of geothermal unitization will concern the method of allocating production
among unit participants. A generally accepted criterion for
such allocation in the oil context is the proportion of production that could have been extracted from each participating
tract in the absence of unitization. Despite recognition of
this criterion, a principal obstacle in any oil or gas participation formula, whether voluntary or compulsory, is to provide
fair treatment to the owners in the common source of supply
when determining the share of production to be allocated to
each tract. 60 Since much more is known about the behavior
of oil and gas in reservoirs than about geothermal deposits, it
follows that similar, if not greater, difficulties will be encountered in the geothermal context.
Since the purpose of allocation in the geothermal context
is the same as in the oil and gas context, there is no reason to
59. The phrase "correlative rights" is a term used to describe the reciprocal rights and
duties of the owners in a common source of supply. An early attempt at a judicial
statement of the oil doctrine by that name is found in Ohio Oil Co. v. State of Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). A statutory definition is contained in NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 522.020(2).
It suffices to note here that the doctrine has two major aspects: (1) each
overlying landowner has a right to lawfully extract oil and gas from a common supply; and (2) each such landowner has a right to protection against damage to the
common supply and a right to a fair and equitable share of the source of supply.
Kuntz, supra note 53, at 217. Whether the courts will apply this doctrine to geothermal resources remains to be seen, but it seems clear that application of the rule

of capture would also require application of this doctrine. Accord, Young v. Ethyl
Corporation, supra note 54,521 F.2d 771,774-775 (8th Cir. 1975).
With reference to the possible application to geothermal resources of a water
law model, it should be noted that there is a somewhat similar doctrine of the same
name applicable to percolating water; in California it derives from Katz v. Walkin60.

shaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 (1902). See HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS 426-454 (1956).
6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 970 at 813. With regard to participation

formulae in general, see Doggett, Practical Legal Problems Encountered in the
Formulation, Operation, and Dissolution of Field-Wide Oil and Gas Units, 16
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 52-58 (1963).
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vary the criterion for allocation. Differences in geology and
reservoir behavior, however, may be significant enough to demand that different factors be considered when making an allocation in the geothermal context. Although lawyers must
ultimately rely upon reservoir engineers to identify factors
relevant to allocation, it is probable that the following factors
will be of some importance:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

porosity of formation underlying the tract;
permeability of formation underlying the tract;
quantity of resources in place beneath the tract;
surface acreage of the tract;
well-productivity;
fracture communication with the reservoir (as The
Geysers model reveals, lands seemingly well located in
relation to a reservoir do not necessarily have good
fracture communication with it; thus, information
concerning degree of fracture communication would
be helpful in evaluating a tract's production potential,
if available); and
(7) potential for reinjection (unlike the oil context, where
injection is often utilized for secondary recovery operations upon tracts from which no further production would otherwise be possible, geothermal operators may often desire to commence injection in the
early stages of production. It may be prudent to consider a tract's utility for increasing ultimate energy recovery through reinjection for purposes of allocating
production; and this would be especially true if reinjection sacrifices or reduces the tract's production value for the overall benefit of the unit. This seems possible, if not likely, since reinjection of cool water has
experimentally produced a "cold front" where:
[T] he rock of contact along the path of travel
has been cooled more or less to the temperature of the injected water. If this "cold front"
reaches the production zone
6 1 of the reservoir,
production will be affected. )
The simplest basis of allocation is the proportion that the
surface acreage of the tract bears to total unit surface acreage.
61.

Einarrson, Vides and Cuellar,supra note 32, at 1360.
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This basis, however, may be inaccurate if the quality of different tracts turns out to vary widely. Nevertheless, in the
case of a unit formed prior to development, it could be the
only basis available. In fact, the federal government has already suggested its use for geothermal unit agreements in unproved areas by including it in Article 13 of Section 271.12
of Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Department of Interior's "acceptable" but "not mandatory" form
of unit agreement.
While such an allocation basis could be reasonable as a
starting point, geothermal unit agreements with surface acreage as the sole allocation basis, if not all geothermal unit agreements, should also contain a mechanism for retroactively reallocating production as geothermal engineering techniques
become more sophisticated and further reservoir data is gathered. Unfortunately, the Department of the Interior's form
of unit agreement does not contain such a mechanism. But
its omission from the form is not necessarily a bar to its use,
however, since Section 271.4 of Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that departures from the form
should be submitted for "preliminary consideration and for
such revision as may be deemed necessary."6

A subsidiary aspect of the allocation problem is the identification of geothermal reservoirs or sub-reservoirs. The
model of The Geysers that emerged at the Parianitrial was
one of a steam-producing district fed with fluid from reserves
of boiling liquid. Despite the considerable data available to
them, experts in that case were unable to state whether there
is more than one pool of such boiling liquid.
Since it is possible that there is more than one reservoir,
it is also possible that any two tracts at The Geysers do not
produce steam from the same liquid reservoir. Although reservoir identification would ordinarily appear to be a preliminary problem, considerable geothermal development and
mathematical modeling may have to be undertaken before
62.

Although oil and gas experiences provide a useful model, traditional oil and gas
practices ought not to be blindly applied to geothermal resources without a prior
examination of the reasons for those practices in the geothermal context. In light
of the state of the art, the federal government's predisposition for the proportional
acreage allocation mechanism seems premature.
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tracts or wells producing from common pools can be identified. Such identification would be important for purposes of
coordinating the injection and production rates in any one
pool as well as for allocating production. Geothermal unit
agreements should provide a mechanism for identifying and
measuring the production from tracts or wells which communicate with common pools. Thereafter, to the extent it is
possible to identify separate reservoirs, sub-units may be created in order to realistically allocate production. 63
2. "Stand-by" Wells
Since geothermal steam must be utilized near its point of
extraction, it will be prudent, if not necessary, to provide a
margin of safety in the quantity of steam available to run a
power plant. At The Geysers, steam supplies in excess of the
production ordinarily needed to operate the power plants are
obtainable from wells available for use in the event a producing well is taken off production. These wells are called "standby" wells."
If the drilling of such wells is to be industry practice, their
economic effect must be taken into account. In a non-unitized
operation such a well would be a financial burden to those
holding interests in the tract upon which it was located. Thus,
where one power plant is fed by steam from several nonunitized tracts which communicate with the same reservoir or
sub-reservoir and the sales agreements or leases provide for
payments or royalties based upon the volume of steam consumed by the power plant, there will be resistance to investing in stand-by wells on property capable of sustaining paying
wells. The State of California has recently drafted a lease provision to deal with this problem on a small tract of leased
state land which is surrounded by private lands also under
geothermal lease.6 5 It is an attempt to insure that the standby burden, if any, is not disproportionately imposed upon
63. See 30 C.F.R. § 271.12,art. 11.8 (1976).
64. Personal communication with the engineering staff of the California State Lands
Division.
65. The California lease provision states:
If the lessee supplies steam to any electrical generating facility from
wells on both leased lands and other lands and there is producible from
all such wells in aggregate a quantity of steam greater than the maximum quantity utilizable by said electrical generating facility, lessee
agrees to produce and sell or use steam from the leased lands in a propor-
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the state property, which has the same operator as the surrounding lands, but is burdened with higher royalties. This
provision creates a number of problems which could easily
become sources of dispute. A unit agreement would make
such complicated provisions unnecessary by allocating unitized
substances on the basis of production potential without regard to the location or number of stand-by wells.
3. Injection
Reference has already been made to a number of problems
concerning injection in a geothermal field and it has been suggested that injection may become standard practice in the
geothermal industry.
Additional problems relating to injection, however, will
arise if the operator desires to locate injection wells on lands
which have no value for production. Such injection well locations might be desirable to avoid cooling in the production
zone. Although injection into non-productive lands might
prove beneficial to the unit as a whole, no single tract owner
would necessarily stand to benefit sufficiently to acquire the
rights necessary to carry out the injection operation. A unitized operation, on the other hand, can minimize the impact
tion no less than the proportion that the absolute open flow potential
(the absolute open flow potential as used herein is the rate of flow in
pounds of steam per hour that would be produced by a well if the only
pressure against the face of the producing formation in the well bore
were atmospheric pressure) of the wells on the leased lands bears to the
total absolute open flow potential of all such wells from which lessee
supplies steam to such electrical generating facility. For purposes of this
section the lessee supplies steam from a well which is not on the leased
lands to an electrical generating facility when the steam produced from
such a well is delivered to said electrical generating facility at least
twenty-five days out of every month. For purposes of this section it shall
be deemed that the lessee supplies steam from a well which is on the
leased lands to an electrical generating facility when such well is capable
of producing geothermal resources in commercial quantities. The absolute open flow potential of all such wells whether on leased lands or
other lands shall be determined by the State Lands Divisions and shall be
based upon tests performed by the lessee as prescribed by the State
Lands Division. In this regard, lessee shall, upon completion of each of
such wells, and prior to the placing of such wells on commercial production, perform, and deliver to the State the results of, the following tests:
a. Pressure-buildup tests to determine static reservoir pressure and
well bore conditions. If pressure-buildup tests are based on shut-in wellhead data, then static well bore temperature surveys must also be conducted;
b. Isochronal flow tests or two rate flow tests to establish a back
pressure curve and the absolute open flow potential;
c. Other tests as deemed to be necessary by the State Lands Division.
After commencement of commercial production from each of such
wells, lessee shall annually, or more frequently if requested by the State
Lands Division, determine static reservoir pressure and complete any
other tests as specified by the State Lands Division.
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of such acquisition by apportioning its costs and benefits
among unit participants.
4. Rights-of-Way
For tracts not themselves large enough to produce quantities of steam sufficient to support a power plant, pipeline
easements or rights-of-way across adjoining properties will
have to be obtained to reach nearby power plants or other
consuming facilities. A small tract, surrounded by another
producing tract or tracts, could not be reached by a nearby
consumer in the absence of some right of passage. The right
of the consumer to use his producer's lands for rights-of-way
to transport resources produced from other lands should be
included in contracts for the sale of geothermal resources.
Such a mechanism will not deal with all situations, however,
since resources from lands between any producer's lands and
his consumer may be sold to a different consumer. Indeed,
such intervening lands may not even be in production.
Utilities, municipalities or other consumers with condemnation powers could resort to eminent domain proceedings
to resolve such difficulties, but they are likely to desire early
resolution in order to raise capital; and condemnation proceedings can be time-consuming and expensive. Where consumers lack condemnation power, one landowner could hold
out his monopoly position for exorbitant compensation. Early commitment to a unitization agreement providing for fieldwide pipeline rights-of-way would eliminate these problems,
avoid delay and probably prevent litigation.
IV. STATUTORY LAW APPLICABLE TO GEOTHERMAL
UNITIZATION IN CALIFORNIA
Since California is the only state with large scale commercial production, an examination of the law concerning unitization there is of special interest. But statutory law applicable
to geothermal unitization there is sparse.
California Public Resources Code Section 3756 requires
that agreements for the purpose of "bringing about cooperative development and operation" or "fixing the time, location,
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and manner of drilling and operating of wells for the production of geothermal resources" must be approved by the California Geothermal Resources Board. Pursuant to the statute,
such approval must be based upon a finding by the Board
that such an agreement is "in the interest of the protection of
geothermal resources from unreasonable waste". No agreement has yet been presented to the Board for its approval
pursuant to this statute.
Also applicable, but of uncertain breadth, is Public Resources Code Section 3700, which states that California, acting through its Oil and Gas Supervisor, "should exercise its
power and jurisdiction to require that wells for the discovery
and production of geothermal resources be drilled, operated,
maintained and abandoned in such manner as to encourage
maximum economic recovery" (emphasis added). Language
directing the Oil and Gas Supervisor to encourage the greatest
"ultimate economic recovery" so as to prevent waste is found
in Public Resources Code Section 3714. Section 3712 of the
same Code states that the chapter in which all three sections
are found shall be liberally construed to meet its purposes
and that the Supervisor "shall have all powers which may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter."
Interestingly, while California Public Resources Code Sections 3712 and 3714 have oil and gas counterparts in Public
Resources Code Sections 3013 and 3016 respectively, the
"require" language of Section 3700 has no oil and gas counterpart. The inclusion of this language in a statutory scheme
that in many respects parallels the oil and gas regulatory provisions in effect at the time of its enactment" seems to have
bestowed upon the California Supervisor greater regulatory
authority with respect to geothermal resources than to oil
and gas. No case has yet construed these provisions, but it
seems certain that a court would find broad regulatory power
vested in the Supervisor, and a sympathetic court could even
construe them as authority to order non-voluntary unitization.Y Since the Supervisor's rules and regulations now make
66. Public Resources Code § 3700 was enacted in 1965. At that time, there was no
general oil and gas compulsory unitization statute in California. Subsequently,

however, in 1971 California Public Resources Code § § 3630 et seq. were enacted.
They provide for compulsory unitization in twenty-year-old fields, three-quarters
of which are within incorporated areas.
67. For a discussion of implied authority to compel unitization, see Whittier, Corn-
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no provision for non-voluntary unitization, however, the latter point may be academic. 8
Unitization affecting state-owned land in California is addressed by Public Resources Code Section 6923; this statute
authorizes the State Lands Commission to consent to its
lessees' "adopting and operating under a cooperative or unit
plan of development or operation" for the purpose of more
properly conserving the natural resources of any geothermal
resources area. This statute incorporates by reference Public
Resources Code Section 3756, thus requiring approval of the
Geothermal Resources Board as well as the State Lands Commission for unitization of state-owned geothermal lands.
Section 18 of the Geothermal Steam Act of 197061 applies
to unitization agreements affecting federal lands in California
as well as other states. It permits voluntary pooling and unitization of federal geothermal lands for the purpose "of properly conserving the natural resources of any geothermal pool,
field, or like area" whenever the Secretary of the Interior determines it to be "necessary or advisable in the public interest". The same statute seems to authorize compulsory unitization in that the Secretary "may prescribe such a plan under
which such lessee shall operate . ... " Pursuant to that statute,
the Department of the Interior has promulgated rules and
regulations which unambiguously assert the federal govern70
ment's authority to order unitized geothermal operations.
V. PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO VOLUNTARY UNITIZATION
Unitization of geothermal resources would provide, as it
does in the oil context, valuable benefits in the form of increased energy recovery, increased profits and protection of
pulsory Pooling and Unitization: Die-Hard Kansas, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 307,
320-323 (1967).
There is authority for the proposition that a regulatory agency may not order
non-voluntary unitization of oil or gas fields without express enabling legislation.
E.g., Dobson v. Arkansas Oil and Gas Comm'n, 218 Ark. 160, 235 S.W.2d 23
(1951) and Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Baker 197 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1952). Although Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., supra note 53, is sometimes cited
for the same proposition, it would be distinguishable since (1) the State was not a
party and (2) the California Supervisor's authority with regard to geothermal resources differs from his authority with regard to oil and gas, as discussed herein.
68. The geothermal rules and regulations of the California Oil and Gas Supervisor begin
at 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 1900.
69. 30 U.S.C. § 1017 (1971).
70. 30 C.F.R. § 271.1 (1976).
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correlative rights. Voluntary unitization, however, is not likely to be completely successful in achieving the desired results
since those considerations which make unitization most desirable are often obstacles to its voluntary implementation. It is
almost certain that voluntary attempts at unitization in the
geothermal context will be no more successful than in the oil
context where such attempts are too often frustrated.71 Perhaps the most serious obstacle is the necessity to secure the
consent to unitize of all persons having an interest in the producing formation

."

In part, the inability to achieve full consent to unitization
has been attributed to gambler's instinct or "rugged individualism". 73 This may be the demand of an overlying landowner for concessions that adjacent landowners are unwilling to
make; but it may also be his willingness to wager that his
lands will support production volumes in excess of his proposed share of unitized production.
This obstacle is well illustrated by the facts reported in
Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co.7 1 In that case, the

unsuccessful plaintiffs sought court-imposed unitization to
force defendants to take part in a gas recycling operation that
was allegedly capable of increasing ultimate oil recovery by at
least 61,000,000 barrels of oil - then valued at $166,000,000
- which would otherwise be wasted. Plaintiff's share of the
loss was estimated to be in excess of $66,000,000. There, one
of the defendants offered to participate only under a proposal
that "would allot to it a part of the total production equal in
value to more than twice the value of the recoverable oil and
gas and other hydrocarbons under the leases." 7 5
A second cause of failure to achieve full consent is extremely fragmented ownership. An example of the difficul71. See INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N, supra note 40, at 182; Smith, supra note
23, at 568; Whittier, supra note 67, at 310-311; Myers, supra note 9, at 7-13; and 6
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 910 at 85-89.
72. See INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N, supra note 40, at 185 and 6 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 2, § 910 at 85.

73. Whittier, supra note 67, at 310.
74. 92 Cal. App. 2d 299,206 P.2d 944 (1949). See notes 53 and 67, supra.
75. Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., supra note 74, at 947; The INTERSTATE
OIL COMPACT COMM'N, supra note 40, at 185, states that more than one unit has
been created at the cost of a "pound of flesh". See also Hunter v. Hussy, 90 So.2d
429 (La. App..1956) where holders of one and one-half percent of the producing
interests and five percent of the royalty interests frustrated plans for unit operations.
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ties arising from such ownership is Gilles v. Yarbrough76 where
the mineral rights to 572h acres were jointly owned by about
200 people whose interests ranged from 1/10 to 1/3,888.
There, in an unsuccessful action by 150 of these people to
terminate a receivership, it was reported that a court had
previously appointed a receiver to execute an oil and gas lease
because:
[S] aid mineral estate is owned by so many so widely
separated that it would be impossible to obtain an oil
and gas lease from all such parties .... 77
Still another cause of failure to achieve full consent is inability or delay due to the fact that the agreement of minors,
79
incompetents 78 or unlocatable parties is required.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR COMPULSORY
GEOTHERMAL UNITIZATION

It has been argued here that the benefits of unitized operations would be as valuable in the geothermal context as in
the oil and gas context. Refusal to unitize where reservoirs
will otherwise be subject to internal competition will result in
impaired efficiency, increased expenses and reduced energy
recovery. It has also been suggested here that attempts by the
industry to voluntarily unitize geothermal operations will be
subject to the unavoidable obstacles and delays that have reduced the effectiveness of, and sometimes even thwarted, voluntary attempts to unitize hydrocarbon extraction operations. It is therefore concluded that the timely enactment of
compulsory unitization schemes is necessary. Failure of the
various state jurisdictions to do so will condemn the geothermal industry to unnecessary inefficiency and waste.

76. 224 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
77. Id. at 720.
78. See generally Warren, Policy Limitations on Oil and Gas Leasing, 3 U.C.L.A.L.

REV. 474 (1956).
79. See generally Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas
Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 129

(1964).
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